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CARNEY State/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr challenges ruling that a motor home 
does not fit within the vehicle exception to the warrant 
requirement established in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, 149 (1925). 
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2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Petr drove around in 
his motor home soliciting sex from boys in exchange for 
marijuana. 1 Based on the testimony of one of the boys and the 
observations of a narcotics officer, the police went to the 
motor home, which was parked in a public parking lot, and had 
the boy knock on the door to get resp to come out. The 
officers identified themselves, and one of them entered the 
motor home where he saw on a table two bags of marijuana, some 
Ziploc baggies, and a scale. Resp was arrested, and the 
vehicle was seized and driven to the police station where a 
subsequent inventory search revealed more marijuana. 
Resp was charged with possession of marijuana for sale. 
After an unsuccessful motion to suppress, resp pled nolo 
contendere and was put on 3 years probation. The CA set 
reversed on the grounds that a motor home is not subject to 
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The 
court noted that although Carroll rested on the inherent 
mobility of cars, this justification was no longer a valid 
one. Rather, the reason for the exception lies in the 
diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds the 
automobile. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973}; Chambers 
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). The court also relied on 
1The vehicle in question was a "Dodge Mini Motor Home." It 
contained, at least, a bed, a table and chairs, cupboards and a 
refrigerator. The record does not disclose whether additional 
fixtures and appliances, such as bathing and toilet facilities, 
sink, stove, etc., were also present. 
I 
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United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), in which this 
Court held that the inherent mobility of a footlocker did not 
justify a warrantless search of it. Since a motor home, 
although it has the mobility of a car, also has the privacy of 
a home, a warrant is required for a search of it. 
The CA SCt remanded the case to allow resp to withdraw 
his plea. Under CA law, the State had only 60 days in which 
to retry the df without the suppressed evidence. JUSTICE 
REHNQUIST stayed the judgment of the CA set to permit the 
State to file a petition for certiorari. 
~ 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues that under Carroll, 267 
U.S., at 149, 153 (which speaks of a vehicle exception, 
including therein "a sh !_P , motor boat, wagon, or automobile," 
or any other vehicle whi~h "can be quickly moved out of the 
locality:" not just an auto exception), the inherent mobility 
of a vehicle creates sufficient exigency to render a warrant 
-----
unnecessary provided there is probable cause to search. This 
has remained the -primary reason for the exception up to the 
present day. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804-809 
(1982): Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1970). Lack 
~
of a reasonable expectation of privacy serves as an --1 l ind e pendent j~stification"'-for a warrantless search, not a  
vehicle is still mobile. This 
case is important because of the large number of vehicles that 
could be called "motor homes" and, more important, could be 
used as mobile criminal operational centers. ~ 
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Petr further argues that there is a split among the 
Circuits on this question. The CA9 (630 F.2d 1332) has agreed 
with the CA set that a motor home is not subject to the 
vehicle exception because of the heightened expectation of 
privacy associated with the vehicle. Most other Circuits have 
relied on the mobility justification and come out the other 
way. See, e.g., CAl0 (620 F.2d 753); CA6 (472 F.2d 1204) 
(vessel); CA5 (559 F.2d 420). 
Finally, petr argues that the CA set has thrown away the 
brightline test of this Court in favor of an inherently 
uncertain standard which will provide no guidance to law 
enforcement officers. With the expectations of the owner 
paramount, a subcompact with a sleeping bag may be 
as a Winnebago might be used solely for transport. 
"home" just 
And the 
range of vehicle configurations in between (even setting aside 
owner expectations) is enormous. 
Resp argues that the decision below rests on an 
independent and adequate state ground since the opinion 
clearly invokes Art. 1, §13 of the California Constitution. 
All the federal cases cited by the CA set merely serve to 
explicate the independent reasons relied upon by the CA court. 
Resp further argues that this is an inappropriate case 
for review because of the inadequacy of the factual record. 
For example, the physical configuration of the motor home is 
only vaguely described and it is not clear whether it was used 
as resp's primary residence. Furthermore, the conflicts cited 
by petr are "illusory." 
' . 
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Finally, resp claims that the State never even 
established probable cause for the entry. 
4. DISCUSSION: The CA set clearly relied for its 
holding on the precedents of this Court. And the CA set never 
questioned the finding of the lower courts that there was 
probable cause for the entry. Thus, the "vehicle exception" 
issue is properly presented here. Furthermore, although there 
is not a complete description of the contents of the vehicle 
in the record, enough is known to present the issue 
concretely. The Court is unlikely to draw a line that would 
require a police officer to guess in advance whether a 
particular vehicle does or does not have a stove or a sink. 
The issue is both difficult and important. The CA set's - --------------=--
determination is by no means clearly correct, relying as it 
does on a revisionist history of the vehicle exception cases 
in light of Chadwick and Dombrowski. Dombrowski involved an 
inventory search of an impounded, wrecked car. The 
traditional "mobility" rationale was nonexistent and, thus, 
the diminished expectation of privacy in autos (and the good 
faith efforts of the officers to inventory and secure the 
contents) provided an alternative justification for the 
search. Nothing in Dombrowski, or certainly in Chadwick, 
undermines the independent validity of the mobility rationale 
~ 
relied upon from Carroll through Ross, and explicitly not 
limited to autos. 
The Court has never applied the doctrine to motor homes, 
and certainly the proper answer in this context is not self-
- -- 6 -
evident. Some clarification of the doctrine appears 
essential. The split among the Circuits is genuine, and resp 
gives no justification for his claim to the contrary. 
I recommend a GRANT. 
There is a response. 
February 9, 1984 Kellogg Opn in Petn 
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No. 83-859, California v. Carney 
Memorandum for the File 
-
This is a summary memorandum on the basis of a preliminary 
reading of the briefs. 
The question presented is: 
"Whether police officers violated the Fourth 
Amendment when they conducted a warrantless 
search based on probable cause of a 'motor 
home' parked in a public parking lot"? 
y~ 
The case is here on cert from the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia. The petition for cert does not include any opinions other 
than that of the State Supreme Court. The only findings of fact 
with respect to the motor home at issue are those in the opinion 
of the California Supreme Court. The vehicle was in a public 
parking lot. Respondent states in his brief that the vehicle was 
in an "off-street" parking lot. The California Court described 
the vehicle as follows: 
"First and foremost, unlike an automobile 
the primary function of a motor home is not 
transportation. M~ mes are generally 
designed and used as residences; their essen-
tia p rp se is to provi e the occupant with 
living quarters, whether on a temporary or a 
permanent basis. Both Vehicle Code section 
396 and Health and Safety Code sec tion 18008 
refer to ome :g_Qj: as vehj cle 2 ut as 
.ra ucfilre . II - The mo tor home 
at issue ere was equipped with at least a bed, 
a refrigerator, a 47able, chairs, curtains and storage cabinets. - Thus the contents of the 
,~ 
• No. 83-859 
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motor home created a setting that could 
accommodate most private activities 
normally conducted in a fixed home. The 
configuration of the furnishings, together 
with the use of the motor home for all man-
ner of strictly personal purposes, strongly 
suggests that the structure at issue is more 
properly treated as a residence than a mere 
automobile." 
2. 
In a footnote, the California Court states that "The record 
does not disclose what other fixtures, furnishings or appliances 
were installed in this particular motor home. Amicus implies that 
it also had bathing and toilet facilities, but the record is 
silent on this point." 
DEA agents, who had had the mobile home under surveillance 
entered it with clear probable cause but without a warrant. 
They arrested respondent, owner of the home, and searched the 
vehicle. A substantial quantity of marijuana was found. The 
vehicle was taken to police headquarters and a further search 
revealed additional marijuana. 
Neither the brief of the State or the SG deny that the 
DEA agents had plenty of time to obtain a warrant. If the owner 
had attempted to drive the mobile home away, presumably it 
could have been followed. There is no evidence on this point. 
We granted cert to decide whether the warrant clause applies 
to mobile homes. The question is an important and troublesome one. 






No. 83-359 3. 
Independent State Ground 
Respondent's brief argues that the case should be dis-
missed because the Supreme Court of California relied on the 
state constitution and state cases. Respondent acknowledges 
that Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at , adopts an assumption or 
a presumption that no independent state ground will be found to 
exist when "it is not clear from the opinion itself that 
the state court relied upon an adequate and independent state 
ground, and when it fairly appears that the state court rested 
its decision primarily on federal law. 
Respondent's argument is not frivolous. The long California 
opinion commences by citing the state constitution. In addition, 
a number of state cases are cited, including those that have said 
that the California constitution is applied more strictly than 
the Fourth Amendment. But the basic principles relied upon by 
the California court were those established by Supreme Court 
decisions. Virtually every important warrant clause case was 
cited. It will be interesting to see what the Attorney General 






No. 83-359 4. 
The Merits 
The California Court, reversing lower courts, held that the 
automobile exception to the warrant clause is inapplicable to 
a mobile home. It recognized that our cases have based the excep-
tion on two grounds: (i) mobility of automobiles, and (ii) a 
lessoned expectation of privacy in an automobile. Conceding that 
mobile homes - by definition - are mobile though they vary in 
mobility, the California court relied . primarily on its view that 
is no diminution of one's expectation of privacy. The 
close to laying down a "bright line" that 
would treat all mobile homes alike. 
Respondent's brief identifies three significant factors in 
arguing that the autombile exception does not apply "to the facts 
of this case": (i) the area searched was the living quarters; 
(ii) the vehicle was not in transit or stopped on a roadway, 
'-- ---but was "parked off the public street and was being used as a 
residence"; and (iii) a warrant easily could have been obtained. 
The SG and the Attorney General of California disagree . 
Specifically, the SG emphasizes that the automobile exception is 
based on (a) a reduced expectation of privacy; (b) "difficulties 
engendered by its mobility justify relaxation of the warrant 
' I I ~ 
• 
- -
No. 83-359 5. 
requirement"; (c) one's expectation of privacy in a vehicle -
"even one being used for residential purposes - "cannot be 
equated with that of a permanent residence". 
The SG agrees that "there is some point at which a motor 
home should be afforded the protection of a dwelling even 
though it remains potentially mobile." It is emphasized that 
mobile homes vary widely from overnight campers to those 
(in Florida for example) that, in effect, become the residences 
of the occupants. 
My Tentative Views 
Subject to further consideration, I am inclined to affirm. 
At least on the facts of this case, incomplete as they are, 
it appears that this vehicle was being used as a residence or 
at least was capable of being so used. There is nothing in the 
record to the contrary. I do not regard the fact that this 
particular home, found in a parking lot, probably was being 
driven from place to place. Tens of thousands of people, 
often seeking employment, move above the country in vehicles 
used as residences. 
The difficulty is whether to adopt the California "bright 
line" view, or decide the case primarily on its facts. As police 







indeed the extent to which it may be used as a residence, 
there is much to be said for a rather broad bright line. 
I suppose there are some limits such as, for example, the 
overnight camper that lacks any of the characteristics of a 
residence except perhaps camp-type beds or bunks. 
L.F.P . 
6. 
- -~ /0/2-7 (~ /~0149 
~1-~ J ~_._~ 
alb 10/27/84 
~ LL.&~ ~ 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Lee 
No. 83-859, California v. Carney 
BACKGROUND 
Factual Background 
October 27, 1984 
Drug Enforcement Agent Robert Williams observed 
respondent, Carney, approach a Mexican youth in downtown San 
Diego. Williams watched respondent and the boy enter a Dodge 
Mini Motor Home which was parked in a lot in the downtown 





Because he recalled that he had received tips on many 
occasions that the same motor home was used for drug sales by 
another individual, agent Williams noted the license number 
of the mobile home. 
Williams watched the van for about an hour and a 
------~ - __.__,_ - - - _____.._,__ 
quarter, until the youth emerged. Williams approached and 
began to interrogate him. In response to Williams' 
questions, the boy stated that he had allowed respondent to 
~ ~~.£, ~ 
perform oral sex on him. In exchange ,__,£ espondent gave the 
youth a small 
Williams 
,. --
the youth to the mobile home, 
and had the boy knock on the door. Respondent opened the 
door and stepped out. Agent Williams and two fellow DEA 
agents identified th ems elves as law enforcement officials; 
one of the agents looked inside the mobile home and saw on a 
table a large bag of marijuana, a small bag of marijuana, 
some empty plastic bags, and a scale. Respondent was placed 
under arrest. 
marijuana. 
A subsequent search of the van revealed more 
Respondent was charged with a single count of 
possession of marijuana for sale. He pleaded not guilty, and 
moved to suppress the marijuana seized from the motor home. 
This motion was denied, as the trial court found 
"automobile exception" justified a warrantless 
Respondent then entered a plea of nolo contendere. 
that the IL 
search. ~,,Lo 
He was~~ 
sentenced to probation for three years. The California Court 
of Appeals affirmed. 
- -
3. 
II. The Decision Below 
The California Supreme Court found that the vehicle 
' 
/k-&) 
exception to the warrant requirement does not apply to mobile ---------.....__---------.__ __________________ .____..___ J.--1,,(_ 
~.1-o 
homes and reversed. That court accepted the trial court's ~ -
finding that there was probable cause to search the motor c~, 
~f-
home, but found that a motor home is so different from a car ~.a_ 
that a warrant is required to search it. ~ -
In reaching its decision, the California Supreme 
Court recognized that the "underlying rationale" of the 
seminal case of Carroll v. United States, 267 u.s. 132 
(1925), was "the inherent mobility of automobiles." The 
California court found, however, that mobility alone was 
insufficient to support the automobile exception. The court -
supported this reasoning with references to cases: (1) where 
a warrant was found to be required even though the container 
searched was mobile; and ( 2) where warrantless searches of 
automobiles were permitted al though there was little chance 
of the automobile's going anywhere. Quoting this Court's 
opinion in United States v. ~ adwick, 433 u.s. 1 (1977), the 
court concluded that the primary justification for the 
automobile exception is "the diminished expectatiopn of 
privacy which surrounds the automobile." 
The court proceeded from this premise to find the 
automobile exception inapplicable to a motor home because the 
factors that diminish the privacy interest in an automobile 
are absent in a motor home. The primary function of ---------------- - ----
respondent's vehicle was not to provide transportation, but 
- -
4. 
to serve as living quarters. Its functioning as a house was 
not altered by its not being affixed to real property. Nor 
did it matter that respondent might have had a transient 
lifestyle, since expectations of privacy exist in transient-
J/ "'Ti 
occupied hotel rooms. 
- · ~
interior and contents 
"--""---....___ ___ ~ 
The court relied on the fact that the 
of an ordinary mobile home are not 
exposed to the public, and concluded that the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement did not apply, that no 
other exceptions to the warrant requirement applied, and that 
the search was therefore illegal. The evidence acquired in 
the search therefore should have been suppressed, and the 
case was ordered remanded. 1 
DISCUSSION 
I. Applicability to the Automobile Exception 
In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), 
this Court considered the warrantless search of an Oldsmobile 
roadster by federal prohibition agents. The agents stopped 
the car on a route well-known for its heavy bootleg traffic, 
and proceeded to inspect it. Behind the upholstering of the 
1 In support of its position, the California Supreme Court cites 
several of its own cases and the state constitution. The state 
court's discussion, however, focuses only on this Court's fourth 
ameriamen~~ons. Therefore ~ t he judgment below rests on 
independent and adequate state grounds. See Michigan v. Long, 
103 s.ct. 3469 (1983) ("state court indicates clearly and 




seats they found 68 bottles of illicit liquor. Without 
making an arrest of the car's two occupants, the agents 
impounded the car and the liquor. The Court held that the 
warrantless search was "reasonable" for fourth amendment 
purposes because: (J) there was probable cause to believe the 
vehicle contained evidence of a crime; and (2) it was likely 
that due to exigent circumstances the vehicle would have been 
unavailable by the time a warrant was obtained. 
The Carroll Court emphasized that there was a 
difference between fixed and movable premises: 
more 
[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has 
been construed, practically since the beginning of 
the Government,~ s recognizing a necessary 
d ~ffer~ n~ betwe search of a store, dwelling 
house or other structure in respect of which a 
pro95t,. official warrant readily may be obtained, 
andl..Ea-' search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or 
automobile, for contraband goods, where i t---rs" not 
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle 
can be quickly moved out of · t he locality or 
juri sd i ct i on in wn i cn t fie warrant mus t be sought. 
Although Carroll was concerned only with "mobility," 
recent cases indicate that there is another 
justification for the "automobile exception." In United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), federal agents had 
probable cause to believe that respondents' footlocker 
contained marijuana. The agents searched the footlocker 
without respondents' consent or a warrant. This Court held 
that the search violated the respondents' fourth amendment 
rights. It rejected the government's argument that, because 
of the mobility of the footlocker, the "automobile exception" 
- -
6. 
could be used by analogy to justify the warrantless search. 
The Court noted that warrantless searches of automobiles are 
permitted because of the "diminished expectation of privacy c<J,, ~ 
surrounding the automobile." A footlocker, unlike a car, is ~-
a common repository of personal effects, and is "inevitably 
associated with the expectation of privacy." Therefore, the 
agents should have secured a warrant prior to searching the 
footlocker. See also ~ nsas v. Sanders, 442 u.s. 753, 761 ~ t:rft, 
(1979) ("the configuration, use, and regulation of automobiles 
often may dilute the reasonable expectation of privacy that 
exists with respect to differently situated property"); 
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 u.s. 583,590 (1974) (plurality 
opinion) ("it travels public thoroughfares where both its 
occupants and its contents are in plain view"). 
The reasons for the "automobile exception" do not 
justify its use to validate the warrantless search of a 
mobile home. A mobile If '"' home resident clearly expects more --------------- ~ 
privacy than does a car owner. Unlike a car, a mobile home 
is often the repository of personal effects, and its interior 
is usually shielded from view. Therefore, an exception to i 
be justified by the mobile J ~ the warrant requirement cannot 






II. Exigent Circumstances 
Although the "automobile exception" should be held 
inapplicable, "exigent circumstances" will justify the -warrantless search of a motor home. It is important, 
however, that the Court not consider as an "exigent 
circumstance" the "inherent mobility" of the motor home. It 
is true that if the police do not guard a mobile home thought 
to contain evidence, the vehicle may be driven away. 
Nevertheless, a stationary house that contains contraband or 
evidence of a crime presents the police with an equally 
serious problem. If the police do not guard the house, 
someone may enter the home and leave with the evidence. 
There is thus no basis for a claim that a mobile home not in 
motion or about to be driven away presents the police with an 
"exigent circumstance" justifying a warrantless search. 
When a motor home is in motion, on the other hand, 
the police should be allowed to perform warrantless searches. 
It will sometimes be impossible for a policeman to follow a 
vehicle even for the short time required to obtain a 
telephonic warrant. Therefore, without an immediate search, 
the vehicle and the evidence that it contains may well 
disappear. In such a case, "exigent circumstances" support a 





III. Search or Seizure 
In the preceding section, it was suggested that a 
warrantless search is justified in those cases where the 
mobile home is actually in motion or about to be driven away. 
It might be preferable, however, for this Court to hold that 
the police are permitted only to seize the motor home. 
Following the seizure, the police would be required to obtain 
a warrant in order to search the vehicle. This line of 
reasoning might seem foreclosed by Chambers v. Maroney, 399 
U.S. 42 (1970), in which the Court held that there is no 
qualitative difference, in constitutional terms, between a 
search and a seizure. The Chambers Court noted that whether 
a search or a seizure was a greater intrusion was "a 
debatable question and the answer may depend on a variety of 
circumstances." 
I am not convinced that Chambers is dispositive in 
this case. Arguably, when one is talking about mobile homes 
instead of cars, it is clear that a search is a greater 
intrusion than a seizure. Most people would prefer temporary 
immobilization of their motor home to a policeman's search 
through their personal effects. Any individual who prefered 
an immediate searach could consent to one. Cf. Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 63 (1970) ("the device of consent is 
readily available") . Therefore, it might make sense to say 
that even when "exigent circumstances" justify a warrantless 





Because of the owner's high expectation of privacy, 
the "automobile exception" cannot justify the warrantless 
d;'-'),.~~ 
search of a motor home. When the motor home is being moved, ~ 
,A 
however, a warrantless search should be permitted; "exigent 
circumstances" make resort to a magistrate impossible. 
Policemen should have little difficulty determining whether a 
vehicle is a "mobile home," not covered by the "automobile 
exception." If a reasonable person would assume that someone 
resided in the vehicle, a warrantless search would not be 
allowed. On the other hand, if it appeared that the vehicle 
served solely as a means of transportation, then the police 










?ip?> >Jl'FJ{ 2 '&"U.. ~ ~~ ~  
(~ ~d ~ ~-a~ 
~. >-"L-' ~'Ht.., . ,J, ',-)  -p 
~ ~ )-<? ~-7-1 ~ 
'~ ~ ~ ~':7 ~ 
'~-~,~l~~ 
~ ~  -i-7 -p ~~ 
~ e--;r  ~ ,v'~,...-¥71-f ~ i, 
~ '5>1;/ ~(>cl~~-
;-,,(#f~ --J=> ~  ---¥V? 
~.,~.~-
' ,¼  ~-1~ ~ 
...;--,n ~ -/~ ~ s.,~ ~ 
(r-'?J~I 
--
. K ~ e J;>;_ r:I -.co ~~ ~-~ 
~~ ~~ s 
, -~~ 
~T>J--1 rvy~--,%7 ~~ 
~?"11'"~~~~ 
~~;.;7r-p~ --~ 
~~ ~~-0 ,,,~ 
~~~~-1-:1~ 
-~~~~'n 
~~ fa ~~~-r-J,.-,-t.A---. 
I ~ ~ ~  ?7 
: ~~~ --1,-, ~
~ -np ~ ~ ~ ~ 
.. ,~ 
/-67 ~'7rZ/ ?fr O';t ~Im-~ 





. . ~ I 
-'rK~A-~12.d, JI-{) ~--,tj~--- ~ 
.& ~ Az~ ~ L&q_s/cr. ~ -
AJ-~ ~ -~ ~ ). 
~~-~~~~ .... -~~' 
SG- ~t'~f-::.,_, ~ 
' ~~~~ ~ : 
J3oUc., '.~ -~  ~~ 
07 ~ ,,~ . 
. ~ ~ 
{_a)~flv 4~ ~~ ~ 
ct-~~; ~5~.~~-·1 
(_L) ~~~~~~~- ,,~~~~ 
g!f) ( ~ ~~~~} ;ti 
(c) ~~d  . . -~, 
- -L No. 83-859 California v. Carney Conf. 11/2/84 
The Chief Justice ~, 
/~~~~1-~-1-yµ ~ 
~ 4-  . 
~--~ .:(. ~;.,J-,~. ~ 
~~~~k/,cA~~~ 
pk. ~~ LA/-"'<.,.--~ . ,aJ~4 
r,;?~~ 7 o/ f.-v ~A--#-, ~ ~ h.. ,t't &.,A-<.. ~ 
~ ~ ~-I-: ·?£-ttj ~ ~ ~
.4......-~ -
Justice Brennan ~-
/3~kv~ ·ql-~. ~  ~ ~ 
r --~ ~ S~-~~ ~
d~<., ~~ . '. P-( ~i ~ 
~t<lii:;& &,;/;t&i-A 
&:.~ ~L4 ~ ~ ~, ~ 
S G :s ~I-. ~~ ~ 




Justice Marshall ~ 
~~56-
Justice Blackmun ~ , 
~ ~.£.e~~,,Lj- ~~~ ~~~~--Z...C...s,&.c~ 
~~ s6-r ~ ~ 
Justice Powell 7~. 
s-~ ~ ~~ p 
sG~~M<_ 
t;v,,l-
~~~> ~ 1-k 
- -
Justice Rehnquist ~ 
T~I-~ ~~~~ 
c/?~k, 
r' ~ s 6-f ~ k-,,f: 
.. ' 
Justice Stevens ~ A.""1., 
/2 ,f) ~ bf 5 &r !" ~~ 
•· a Sl,.~ • & .. • •• " 
~I-~ ~·~ ~ /3~ ~ -e..1. a.. 
~ ~~~ . ~?-d. c:J  , ,-,.J~ . , ./. 7'~S,5-~~~s/ 
~-- . ..k a, ~ '  ~  /4 /\k~<,  
Justice O'Connor ~ 
~..s t5, ~ ~f-
~ n-<-~ .~ ~ ~ 
~ - r>zw' ·••~ I-~~ 4_ -~ • 
- -
--upr~tnt (!I&tltrl 41f tit~ :J{nittb ~bdt6 
'Jl'uJfiughtn. ,. QI. 2llffe'l, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
February 28, 1985 
Re: 83-859 - California v. Carney 
Dear Chief, 
Although I may come to a different conclusion 
when I write it out, I plan to try my hand at a 
dissenting opinion. 
Chief Justice Burger 




.JUSTICE w .. . ,J. BRENNAN, ,JR. 
-
.hprmtt Qlam:t 4tf tlft ~h .itaft• 
'1u~ J. <J+. 20p,.~ 
March 1, 1985 
No. 83-859 
California v. Carney 
Dear Chief: 
-
At Conference, I said that I could 
go along with a test based on objective 
external indicia to indicate whether a 
vehicle was being used as a home or 
merely as a car. Your opinion appears 
to draw the line based solely on 
mobility. I will therefore probably 
write an opinion concurring in the 
judgment. In the meantime, I'll be 
interested to read John's writing. 
Sincerely, 
·~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
( 
CHAMl!IERS Of' 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
-
~n.prtmt <flonri Df tlft~b ~tat.ts 
•ulfinghtn. J). <fl. 20.;i'!, 
March 1, 1985 
Re: No. 83-859 - California v. Carney 
Dear Harry: 
-
Thank you for your note. It was my understanding at 
Conference that the majority of the Court preferred an objective, 
bright-line test that police on the beat would have a reasonable 
chance of following. I understood the Court's holding to be a 
rejection of the "principal function" test applied by the 
California Supreme Court, and consequently the rejection of a 
similar "primary function" test in this case. 
I believe that the Conference's rejection of the 1.'(;w~</ 
court's "principal function test was ase on sound reasoning. 
Any inquiry into the "primary function" of a vehicle mandates an 
inspection of the interior which the officer has never seen; that 
is inherently subjective and speculative. The record in this 
case, for example, does not indicate with any certainty whether 
the vehicle at issue had as its "primary" function use as a 
vehicle or use as a dwelling; it shows that it was capable of 
being used as either. 
With regard to the Solicitor General, I believe that my 
draft is fully consistent with the Solicitor General's position 
as it applies to the facts of this case. On page 19 of the 
Solicitor General's brief, for example, he states, "[A] motor 
home that is treated by the state as a vehicle for regulatory 
purposes and that is come upon by the police when it is being 
used as a vehicle should be retained within the automobile 
exception." Again, on page 19 note 8, he states, "Our approach 
would thus draw the line between 'vehicles' and 'residences' not 
on the basis of the attributes of the vehicle, but on the basis 
of whether it is at least temporarily affixed to the site or is 
fully mobile." (emphasis added) My draft conforms to that 
approach; I would welcome suggestions how to make it more so. 
As to your suggestion that the location of the vehicle is 
important, we recognize that this case involves a vehicle parked 
in a public lot. Our decision thus does not--and, properly, 
should not--decide what standard would apply to a vehicle parked 
in a different sort of setting. I could readily include language 
leaving for another day determination of what standards would 
apply if a vehicle such as this one is not parked on or near a 
- -
- 2 -
public thoroughfare, but for vehicles out an the street I am 
persuaded that the simplest, soundest "test" is ready mobility, 
which would likely exclude a "vehicle" with plumbing and power 
attachments to public facilities. 
' 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMl!!IERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
-
~tn1t <!fomt of tlft ~a ~tatt• 
-.rulti:tt¼lton. ~. <!f. 2.0ffe~.;t 
Re: No. 83-859, California v. Carney 
Dear Chief: 
~- ~- .. ~ ! -
March 1, 1985 
I have some difficulty with your opinion in this case. I 
thought that a majority of the Conference wished to pursue the 
Solicitor General's primary position, that is, that searches of 
motor homes concern conflicting interests in privacy and in 
effective use of the police power, that prJmary use of the motor 
home is the important and governing factcFr, and that, therefore, 
when a motor home is being used primarily as a home, privacy 
rights prevail, whereas when it is used primarily for transpor-
tation, it should be treated as a mobile vehicle for purposes of 
the automobile exception. A bright-line rule reflecting this 
balance would focus on the location of the vehicle. For me, 
when these standards are applied, this case is not a difficult 
one, for dwelling indicia are minimal when a motor home is 
parked off a city street. 
Because your draft appears not to recognize sufficiently 
any expectation of privacy in a home that happens to be mobile, 
and seems to rely exclusively on mobility in determining the 
applicability of the automobile exception (except for the situa-
tion described in footnote 3), it does not reflect the balance 
between privacy interests and police interests that I prefer and 
that I thought the conference majority had struck. Indeed, the 
draft suggests that if the home is •readily mobile,• it is sub-
ject to the automobile exception regardless of other consider-
ations. See draft at page 5. If this remains your view, I 
cannot join the opinion and I shall have to write separately in 
concurrence. 
The Chief Justice 






03/05/85 J ~ ~J-4,,~ 4_. 4af I-~ 
a~~ c _q_ ~~J._. 
TO: Justice 
FROM: Lee 
Powell -/2 &~-~~~id~ 
RE: No. 83-859, California v. 
the Court opinion 
Carney, the Chief's first draft of 
Your notes indicate that everyone at Conference (with 
the exception of the Chief) agreed with the SG's position. 
Unfortunately, the Chief's opinion is inconsistent with this 
conference vote. 
The SG recognizes that there are two rationales for the 
.,i. -~, 
"automobile exception": (J ) mob,ili ty; and ~!)/ a reduced 
expectation of privacy. The SG goes on to state that it is 
"undeniable that greater privacy interests may be implicated by a 
search of a camper or motor home than of a conventional 
automobile." SG brief, p. 12." Because of this greater 
expectation of privacy, warrantless searches of motor homes 
should be allowed only when the vehicle is "subject to state 
motor vehicle registration laws and [and] .•• on a public street 
or parked in a location inapropriate for residence." SG brief, 
p. 6. 
The Chief's opinion states that mobility is the - --
"principal foundation" for the automobile exception to the 
----
warrant requirement. It goes on to concede that the automobile 
exception is based in part on the lessened expectation of privacy 




effectively eliminates the individual's "expectation of privacy" 
as an independent factor in the analysis. It states that there - -- --- . .,__ ~- ~
is a lessened expectation of privacy in all movable vehicles 
because "'individuals always [have] been on notice that movable 
vessels may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise to 
probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband, without the 
protection afforded by a magistrate's prior evaluation of those 
facts. " 1 Draft Op. 6 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798 (1982). This is the most circular reasoning that I have ever 
seen in a Court opinion. It also follows from this reasoning 
that any vehicle that is mobile can be searched without a 
warrant. 
The Chief's opinion must be altered if it is to conform 
to the Conference vote. The Chief should first recognize that an 
individual may have a greater expectation of privacy in a mobile 
;,:JI' 
home than he does in an automobile. He should then state that 
- ;;IJtli, 
{ despite this difference, a mobile home can be searched without a 
/ warrant if it is: (1) registered as a motor vehicle; and (2) on a 
public thoroughfare or parked in a public lot. Both of these 
conditions clearly are satisfied in this case. The Chief comes 
close to making this point when he quotes your concurring opinion 
in Rakas. 
The Chief is correct in stating that it is unnecessary 
to decide what standard would apply if the mobile home had not 
been "parked on or near a public street." See Chief's memo of 
March 1, 1985. His draft opinion, however, already has decided 
~ 
- -
this issue by indicating that mobility alone justifies the 
warrantless search of a mobile home. 
At this point, I do not know what course you will want 
to pursue. The Chief's clerk has told me that he is working on a 
second draft of the Court opinion. I also would like to see 
Justice Stevens' dissent. He will argue that because of the 
greater expectation of privacy in mobile homes, warrantless 
searches of these vehicles should be allowed only when they are 
stopped while in motion. This would limit the exception to cases 
where exigent circumstances justify a departure from the warrant 
requirement. Maybe it would be best to "sit tight" for now and 




TO: Lee DATE: March 7, 1985 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 3 
83-859 California v. Carney 
'rake a close look at the rough draft of a propose 
letter to the Chief. I am asking Sally to give you the 
draft as she transcribes it without my having an opportunity 
to look at it. Make such changes as you think appropriate, 
and send me a copy to review. 
L • F • P • , ,l r • 
ss 







From: The Chief Justice 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-859 
CALIFORNIA, PETITIONER v. CHARLES R. CARNEY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
[April -, 1985] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether law enforcement 
agents violated the Fourth Amendment when they conducted 
a warrantless search, based on probable cause, of a fully 
mobile "motor home" located in a public place. 
I 
On May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Agency Agent 
Robert Williams watched respondent, Charles Carney, 
approach a youth in downtown San Diego. The youth ac-
companied Carney to a Dodge Mini Motor Home parked in a 
nearby lot. Carney and the youth closed the window shades 
in the motor home, including one across the front window. 
Agent Williams had previously received uncorroborated 
information that the same motor home was used by another 
person who was exchanging marihuana for sex. Williams, 
with assistance from other agents, kept the motor home 
under surveillance for the entire one and one-quarter hours 
that Carney and the youth remained inside. When the 
youth left the motor home, the agents followed and stopped 
him. The youth told the agents that he had received mari-
huana in return for allowing Carney sexual contacts. 
At the officers' request, the youth returned to the motor 














CALIFORNIA v. CARNEY 
-
agents identified themselves as law enforcement officers. 
Without a warrant or consent, one agent entered the motor 
home and observed marihuana, plastic bags, and a scale of 
the kind used in weighing drugs on a table. Agent Williams 
took Carney into custody and took possession of the motor 
home. A subsequent search of the motor home at the police 
station revealed additional marihuana in the cupboards and 
refrigerator. 
Respondent was charged with possession of marihuana for 
sale. At a preliminary hearing, he moved to suppress the 
evidence discovered in the motor home. The magistrate de-
nied the motion, upholding the initial search as a justifiable 
search for other persons, and the subsequent search as a rou-
tine inventory search. 
Respondent renewed his suppression motion in the Supe-
rior Court. The Superior Court also rejected the claim, 
holding that there was probable cause to arrest respondent, 
that the search of the motor home was authorized under the 
automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
requirement, and that the motor home itself could be seized 
without a warrant as an instrumentality of the crime. Re-
spondent then pleaded nolo contendere to the charges against 
him, and was placed on probation for three years. 
Respondent appealed from the order placing him on proba-
tion. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning 
that the vehicle exception applied to respondent's motor 
home. PeO'ple v. Carney, 117 Cal. App. 3d 36 (1981). 
The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction. 
PeO'ple v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597, 668 P. 2d 807 (1983). The 
Supreme Court did not disagree with the conclusion of the 
trial court that the agents had probable cause to arrest 
respondent and to believe that the vehicle contained evidence 
of a crime; however, the court held that the search was un-
reasonable because no warrant was obtained, rejecting the 
State's argument that the vehicle exception to the warrant 
-
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requirement should apply. 1 That court reached its decision 
by concluding that the mobility of a vehicle "is no longer the 
prime justification for the automobile exception; rather, it 
said, 'the answer lies in the diminished expectation of privacy 
which surrounds the automobile.'" 34 Cal. 3d, at 605, 668 
P. 2d, at 811. The California Supreme Court held that the 
expectations of privacy in a motor home are more like those 
in a dwelling than in an automobile because the primary func-
tion of motor homes is not to provide transportation but to 
"provide the occupant with living quarters." 34 Cal. 3d, at 
606, 668 P. 2d, at 812. 
We granted certiorari, 465 U. S. -- (1984). We 
reverse. 
II 
The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures." This funda-
mental right is preserved by a requirement that searches be 
conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an independent 
judicial officer. There are, of course, exceptions to the gen-
eral rule that a warrant must be secured before a search is 
undertaken; one is the so-called "automobile exception" at 
issue in this case. This exception to the warrant require-
ment was first set forth by the Court sixty years ago in Car-
roll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). There, the Court 
recognized that the privacy interests in an automobile are 
1 Respondent contends that the state court decision rests on an adequate 
and independent state ground, because the opinion refers to the state as 
well as the federal constitutions. Respondent's argument is clearly fore-
closed by our opinion in Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. --, -- (1983), in 
which we held, "when ... a state court decision appears to rest primarily 
on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal Jaw, and when the ade-
quacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from 
the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation 
that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that 
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constitutionally protected; however, it held that the ready 
mobility of the automobile justifies a lesser degree of protec-
tion of those interests. The Court rested this exception on 
a long-recognized distinction between stationary structures 
and vehicles: 
"[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been con-
strued, practically since the beginning of Government, 
as recognizing a necessary difference between a search 
of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of 
which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, 
and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, 
for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to se-
cure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved 
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant 
must be sought." Id., at 153 (Emphasis added). 
The capacity to be "quickly moved" was clearly the basis of 
the holding in Carroll , and our cases have consistently recog-
nized ready mobility as one of the principal bases of the auto-
mobile exception. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 
U. S. 58, 59 (1967); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 
52 (1970); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 442 (1973); 
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 588 (1974); South Dakota 
v. Opperman , 428 U. S. 364, 367 (1976). In Chambers, for 
example, commenting on the rationale for the vehicle excep-
tion, we noted that "the opportunity to search is fleeting 
since a car is readily movable." 399 U. S. , at 51. More 
recently, in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 806 (1982), 
we once again emphasized that "an immediate intrusion is 
necessary" because of "the nature of an automobile in tran-
sit . ... " The mobility of automobiles, we have observed, 
"creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical 
necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement 
is impossible." South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, at 367. 
However, although ready mobility alone was perhaps the 
original justification for the vehicle exception, our later cases 
., -
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have made clear that ready mobility is not the only basis for 
the exception. The reasons for the vehicle exception, we 
have said, are twofold. Id., at 367. "Besides the element of 
mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because 
the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is 
significantly less than that relating to one's home or office." 
Ibid. 
Even in cases where an automobile was not immediately 
mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its 
use as a readily mobile vehicle justified application of the ve-
hicular exception. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, supra. 
In some cases, the configuration of the vehicle contributed to 
the lower expectations of privacy; for example, we held in 
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590 (1974), that, because 
the passenger compartment of a standard automobile is rela-
tively open to plain view, there are lesser expectations of 
privacy. But even when enclosed "repository" areas have 
been involved, we have concluded that the lesser expecta-
tions of privacy warrant application of the exception. We 
have applied the exception in the context of a locked car 
trunk, Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, a sealed package in a car 
trunk, Ross, supra, a closed compartment under the dash-
board, Chambers v. Maroney, supra, the interior of a vehi-
cle's upholstery, Carroll, supra, or sealed packages inside a 
covered pickup truck, United States v. Johns, -- U. S. 
-(1985). 
These reduced expectations of privacy derive not from the 
fact that the area to be searched is in plain view, but from 
the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on 
the public highways. Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, at 440-
441. As we explained in South Dakota v. Opperman, an in-
ventory search case, 
"Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive 
and continuing governmental regulation and controls, in-
cluding periodic inspection and licensing requirements. 
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vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have 
expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or 
excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other 
safety equipment are not in proper working order." 
Id., at 368. 
The public is fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in j 
its automobiles because of this compelling governmental need 
for regulation. Historically, "individuals always [have] been 
on notice that movable vessels may be stopped and searched 
on facts giving rise to probable cause that the vehicle con-
tains contraband, without the protection afforded by a magis-
trate's prior evaluation of those facts." Ross, supra, at 806, 
n. 8. In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation, which 
necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the 
exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches with-
out prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as 
the overriding standard of probable cause is met. 
When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is ) 
readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place 
not regularly used for residential purposes-temporary or 
otherwise-the two justifications for the vehicle exception 
come into play. 2 First, the vehicle is obviously readily mo-
bile by the turn of a switch key, if not actually moving. Sec-
ond, there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from 
its use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police 
regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling. At least in these 
circumstances, the overriding societal interests in effective 
law enforcement justify an immediate search before the vehi-
cle and its occupants become unavailable. 
While it is true that respondent's vehicle possessed some, 
if not many of the attributes of a home, it is equally clear that 
2 With few exceptions, the courts have not hesitated to apply the vehicle 
exception to vehicles other than automobiles. See e.g., United States v. 
Rollins, 699 F. 2d 530 (CAll), cert. denied, -- U. S. -- (1983) (air-
plane); State v. Mower, 407 A. 2d 729 (Maine 1979) (converted school bus 
used as a home). 
-
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the vehicle falls clearly within the scope of the exception laid 
down in Carroll and applied in succeeding cases. Like the 
automobile in Carroll, respondent's motor home was readily 
mobile. Absent the pro'mpt searcli and sefzure, it could 
reaillly have been moved beyond the reach of the police. 
Furthermore, the vehicle was licensed to "operate on public 
streets; [was] serviced in public P!~:,ef . .. and [was] subject 
to extensive regulation and insp~~-" Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U. S. 128, 154, n. 2. (1978) (POWELL, J., concurring). 
And the vehicle was so situated that an objective observer 
would conclude that it was being used not as a residence, but 
as a vehicle. 
Respondent urges us to distinguish his vehicle from other 
vehicles within the exception because it was capable of June-I 
tioning as a home. In our increasingly mobile society, many 
vehicles used for transportation can be and are being used 
not only for transportation but for shelter, i. e., as a "home" 
or "residence." To distinguish between respondent's motor 
home and an ordinary sedan for purposes of the vehicle ex-
ception would require that we apply the exception depending 
upon the size of the vehicle and the quality of its appoint-
ments. Moreover, to fail to apply the exception to vehicles 
such as a motor home ignores the fact that a motor home 
lends itself easily to use as an instrument of illicit drug traffic 
and other illegal activity. In United States v. Ross, supra, 
at 822, we declined to distinguish between "worthy" and 
"unworthy'' containers, noting that "the central purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction." We 
decline tod~ t~istinguish between "worthy'' and_"unwor-
thy"vemcfeswhic'h7Ireeitlier on the public roads and high-
~ 
ways, or situated such that it is reasonable to conclude that 
the vehicle is not being used as a residence. 
Our application of the vehicle exception has never turned 
on the other uses to which a vehicle might be put. The ex-
ception has historically turned on the ready mobility of the 
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objectively indicates that the vehicle is being used for trans-
portation. 3 These~ <lll¥"e~ e!!_ts__io~ tion of the 
e~ n ensure that law eruorcemenfofficials are not un-
necessarily hamstrung in their efforts to detect and prosecute 
criminal activity, and that the legitimate privacy interests of 
the public are protected. Applying the vehicle exception in 
these circumstances allows the essential purposes served by 
the exception to be fulfilled, while assuring that the excep-
tion will acknowledge legitimate privacy interests. 
III 
The question remains whether, apart from the lack of a 
warrant, this search was unreasonable. Under the vehicle 
exception to the warrant requirement, "[o]nly the prior 
approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise 
[must be such] as the magistrate could authorize." Ross, 
supra, at 823. 
This search was not unreasonable; it was plainly one that 
the magistrate could authorize if presented with these facts. 
The police had fresh, direct, uncontradicted evidence that the 
respondent was distributing a controlled substance from the 
vehicle, apart from evidence of other possible offenses. The 
police thus had abundant probable cause to enter and search 
the vehicle for evidence of a crime notwithstanding its possi-
ble use as a dwelling place. 
The judgment of the California Supreme Court is reversed, 
and the case is remanded for further proceedings not incon-
sistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
3 We need not pass on the application of the vehicle exception to a motor 
home that is situated in a way or place that objectively indicates that it is 
being used as a residence. Among the factors that might be relevant in 
determining whether a warrant would be required in such a circumstance 
is its location, whether the vehicle is readily mobile or instead, for instance, 
elevated on blocks, whether the vehicle is licensed, whether it is connected 
to utilities, and whether it has convenient access to a public road. 
, - -
March 8 , 1985 
PF.FSONAL 
83- 859 California v. Carnev 
Dear Chief : 
Although I aaree with much of vour first draft 
(that I read to~ay for the first time) , r a~ sen~ina t~is 
private letter becauqe I would have difficulty ioinina your 
opinion in its present form . tt is clear from the Confer-
e~ce votes that we agrePd with thP s~•s primarv ~eaqo~ing . 
I enclo$e n copy of mv Conference note~ . 
The SG ,recoqnizes t~at there are two rationales 
for the ~automobile exceotion" : (i) mobilitvr ano (ii) a 
reduced exoect~tion of privacy . The S~ goe$ on to statP 
that it is "undeninbl~ that greater orivacv interestq mav be 
implicated by a search of a camper or ~otor home than of a 
conventional ~utomohile . " SG bri~f, 9. 12. Becauqe of this 
greater exoPctati_on of privacy, •~arrantless seat:ches of mo-
tor ~omes shoulo be allowed only when the vehicle is nsub-
ject to state motor vehicle reg'istration laws fan<l1 • •• on a 
oublic street or parked in a location inaporopriate for res-
idence . " SG brief , n . 6 . 
Your opinion states that mobility is the "orinci-
pal foundation" for the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement . rhi$ was certainly true initially . We reo~at-
edlv have '1ela in sut)sequent cases, "1owever, that. the excP-p-
tion ~l~o is iu~tifie1 by the lessene~ exo~ctation of oriva-
cy that an incividual has in his automo~ile. See Arkansas 
v . Sanders, 442 u. s . 753, 761 (1979) ("confiquration, use , 
and regulation of automobiles often may dilute the reason-
able expectation of privacy") : South Dakota v . Opperman , 428 
U. S . 364, 367 (1976) ("less rigorous warrant requirements 
govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to 
one ' s automobile is significantly less than that relating to 
one ' s home or office") . In deciding whether a motor home 
c~n be searched without a warrant, we cannot ignore this 
second rationale for thP. automobiJ@ exception . 
I do not believe that~ "briqht line" can be drawn 
based solely on whether or not the vehicle is mobile because 




of mobile homes than in an automobile. There are, for exam-
ple, thousands of mobile homes in Florida - and indeed in 
many other states - that are occupied as principal resi-
dences. Thev are connected to public utilitv SPrvices pro-
vided in mobile home parks. For the most oart, objective 
facts distinguish a vehicle used as a residence from one 
used solely for transporation. 
Although these motor homes often are used as resi-
dences, they also may be moved on the highway (e.q., to 
Florida for thP wintPr). While moving on a public highway, 
parked on a public street, or - as in this case - parked in 
a location inaopropriate for a residence, these factors out-
weigh the "expectation of privacy" interests. The fact of 
mobility becomes the par~mount Factor. 
In sum, t believe that both of th0 rationales for 
the Automobile exception must be consi~ere~ - as the SG ar-
guP~. In this case, mobility justifie~ the warr~ntlesR 
entry. My Conference notes that make reasonablv clear that 
a11 of u~ exc~pt John agreed with the SG. 





JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
-
.§nprtmt (!l'1Uri of tlf t Jnittb ~tait.e 
-.rasqi:ttg~ J. (!l. 20.;i~$ 
March 8, 1985 
Re: No. 83-859 California v. Carney 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 




A\uprnnt (ll&mrl of tl{t J'nitt:b ;ltait.e' 
~qinghm. ~. (ll. 211.;;~, 
CHAMl!IERS O r 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE March 11, 1985 
83-859 - California v. Carney 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
~\""" 
The Chief Justice 




,jn.prtmt QJourt of tJrt ~b ,jtaftg 
Jfuqinghtn. ~- <q. 20ffeJ!.~ 
THEcH1EFJusT1cE March 13, 1985 
Re: No. 82-859 - California v. Charles R. Carney 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
A few "extracurricular" matters, e.g., Judicial Conference, 
Williamsburg Conference, sessions on the 3.5 COLA, and security 
problems have held up my work on this case. 
However, I expect to have a new draft taking into account 












From: Justice Stevens 
Circulated: APR 18 1985 
Recirculated: ___ ______ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF TIIE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-859 
CALIFORNIA, PETITIONER v. CHARLES R. CARNEY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
The character of "the place to be searched" 1 plays an im-
portant role in Fourth Amendment analysis. In this case, 
police officers searched a Dodge/Midas Mini Motor Home. 
The California Supreme Court correctly characterized this 
vehicle as a "hybrid" which combines "the mobility attribute 
of an automobile ... with most of the privacy characteristics 
of a house." 2 
The hybrid character of the motor home places it at the 
crossroads between the privacy interests that generally for-
bid warrantless invasions of the home, Payton v. New York, 
445 U. S. 573, 585-590 (1980), and the law enforcement inter-
ests that support the exception for warrantless searches of 
automobiles based on probable cause, United States v. 
Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 806, 820 (1982). By choosing to follow 
the latter route, the Court errs in three respects: it has en-
tered new territory prematurely, it has accorded priority to 
an exception rather than to the general rule, and it has aban-
doned the limits on the exception imposed by prior cases. 
1 The Fourth Amendment provides: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses , papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized." U. S. Const., Arndt. 4. 
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In recent Terms, the Court has displayed little confidence 
in state and lower federal court decisions that purport to en-
force the Fourth Amendment. Unless an order suppressing 
evidence is clearly correct, a petition for certiorari is likely to 
garner the four votes required for a grant of plenary re-
view-as the one in this case did. Much of the Court's "bur-
densome" workload is a product of its own aggressiveness in 
this area. By promoting the Supreme Court of the United 
States as the High Magistrate for every warrantless search 
and seizure, this practice has burdened the argument docket 
with cases presenting fact bound errors of minimal signifi-
cance. 3 It has also encouraged state legal officers to file pe-
titions for certiorari in even the most frivolous search and sei-
zure cases. 4 
The Court's lack of trust in lower judicial authority has re-
sulted in another improvident exercise of discretionary juris-
diction. 5 In what is at most only a modest extension of our 
3 E. g., United States v. Johns, -- U. S. -- (1985); United States v. 
Sharpe, - U. S. - (1985); Oklahoma v. Castleberry, - U. S. -
(1985). Cf. Florida v. Rodriguez, - U. S. -, -(1984) (STEVENS, 
J., dissenting, joined by BRENNAN, J.). 
'See, e. g. State v. Caponi, 12 Ohio St. 3d 302, 466 N. E. 2d 551 (1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U. S. -- (1985). The Court's inventiveness in the 
search and seizure area has also emboldened state legal officers to file peti-
tions for certiorari from state court suppression orders that are explicitly 
based on independent state grounds. See, e. g., Jamison v. State, 455 So. 
2d 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. - (1985); 
Gannaway v. State, 448 So. 2d 413 (Ala. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. --
(1985); State v. Burkholder, 12 Ohio St. 3d 205, 466 N. E. 2d 176, cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. - (1984); People v. Corr, - Colo.-, 682 P. 2d 20, 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. -- (1984); State v. Von Bulow, -- R. I.--, 
475 A. 2d 995, cert. denied, - U. S. - (1984). 
5 Michigan v. Long, -- U.S.--, -- (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissent-
ing); California v. Ramos, -- U.S. -- U.S.--, -- (1983) (STE-
VENS, J., dissenting); Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U. S. 36, 72-73 
(1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 273 (1981) 
-
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Fourth Amendment precedents, the California Supreme 
Court held that police officers may not conduct a non-exigent 
search of a motor home without a warrant supported by prob-
able cause. The State of California filed a petition for certio-
rari contending that the decision below conflicted with the 
authority of other jurisdictions. 6 Even a cursory examina-
tion of the cases alleged to be in conflict revealed that they 
did not consider the question presented here. 7 
(STEVENS, J ., concurring). See also Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial 
Restraint, 66 Judicature 177, 182 (1982). 
6 Pet. for Cert. 15-17, 21, 24-25. The petition acknowledged that the 
decision below was consistent with dictum in two recent Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals decisions. See United States v. Wiga, 662 F . 2d 1325, 
1329 (CA9 1981), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 918 (1982); United States v. Wil-
liams, 630 F. 2d 1322, 1326 (CA9), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 865 (1980). 
7 Only one case contained any reference to heightened expectations of 
privacy in mobile living quarters. United States v. Cadena, 588 F. 2d 100, 
101-102 (CA5 1979) (per curiam). Analogizing to automobile cases, the 
court upheld the warrantless search of an ocean-going ship while in transit. 
The court observed that the mobility "exception" required probable cause 
and exigency, and "that the increased measure of privacy that may be ex-
pected by those aboard a vessel mandates careful scrutiny both of probable 
cause for the search and the exigency of the circumstances excusing the 
failure to secure a warrant." Id. , at 102. 
In all of the other cases, defendants challenged warrantless searches for 
vehicles claiming either no probable cause or the absence of exigency under 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U. S. 443 (1971). United States v. 
Mont,gomery, 620 F. 2d 753, 760 (CAlO), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 882 (1980) 
("camper"); United States v. Clark, 559 F . 2d 420, 423-425 (CA5), cert. de-
nied, 434 U. S. 969 (1977) ("camper pick-up truck"); United States v. 
Lovenguth, 514 F. 2d 96, 97 (CA9 1975) ("pick up with . . . camper top"); 
United States v. Cusanelli, 472 F. 2d 1204, 1206 (CA6 1973) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 412 U. S. 953 (1973) (two camper trucks); United States v. 
Miller, 460 F. 2d 582, 585-586 (CAlO 1972) ("motor home"); United States 
v. Rodgers, 442 F. 2d 902, 904 (CA 5 1971) ("camper truck"); State v. Mil-
lion, 120 Ariz. 10, 15-16, 583 P. 2d 897, 902-903 (1978) ("motor home"); 
State v. Sardo, 112 Ariz. 509, 513-514, 543 P. 2d 1138, 1142 (1975) ("motor 
home"). Only Sardo involved a vehicle that was not in transit, but the mo-
tor home in that case was about to depart the premises. 
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This is not a case "in which an American citizen has been 
deprived of a right secured by the United States Constitution 
or a federal statute. Rather, ... a state court has upheld a 
citizen's assertion of a right, finding the citizen to be pro-
tected under both federal and state law." Michigan v. 
Long, --U. S. --, --(1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
As an unusually perceptive study of this Court's docket 
stated with reference to California v. Ramos, -- U. S. 
-- (1983), "this ... situation ... rarely presents a compel-
ling reason for Court review in the absence of a fully perco-
lated conflict." 8 The Court's decision to forge ahead has es-
tablished a rule for searching . motor homes that is to be 
homes in transit, notwithstanding a claim of heightened privacy interests. 
See State v. Mower, 407 A. 2d 729, 732 (Me. 1979); State v. Le:pley, 243 
N. W. 2d 41,42-43 (Minn. 1984). Those cases-which were not cited in 
the petition for certiorari-are factually distinguishable from the search of 
the parked motor home here. In any case, some conflict among state 
courts on novel questions of the kind involved here is desirable as a means 
of exploring and refining alternative approaches to the problem. See 
infra, at --. 
8 Estreicher & Sexton, New York University Supreme Court Project, 
Appendix to the Executive Summary A-4. The study elaborated: 
"[C]ases in which a state court has invalidated state action on a federal 
ground should not be heard by the Court in the absence of a conflict or a 
decision to treat the case as a vehicle for a major pronouncement of federal 
law. Without further percolation, there is ordinarily little reason to be-
lieve that such an issue is one of recurring national significance; and correc-
tion of error, even regarding a matter of constitutional law, is not a suffi-
cient basis for Supreme Court intervention. Here, unlike a federal court's 
invalidation of state action, structural justification for intervention is gen-
erally missing, given the absence of vertical federalism difficulties and the 
built-in assurance that state courts functioning under significant political 
constraints are not likely lightly to invalidate state action even on federal 
grounds .... [The Court] should not grant ... merely to correct perceived 
error." Id., at 22-23. 
Chief Justice Samuel Roberts, Retired, of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has expressed similar concerns. Roberts, The Adequate and Inde-
pendent State Ground: Some Practical Considerations, 17 Inst. Jud. 
Admin. Rep. , No. 2, p. 1-2 (1985). 
" -
83-859-DISSENT 
CALIFORNIA v. CARNEY 
-
5 
followed by the entire nation. If the Court had merely al-
lowed the decision below to stand, it would have only gov-
erned searches of those vehicles in a single State. The 
breadth of this Court's mandate counsels greater patience be-
fore we offer our binding judgment on the meaning of the 
Constitution. 9 
Premature resolution of the novel question presented has 
stunted the natural growth and refinement of alternative 
principles. Despite the age of the automobile exception and 
the countless cases in which it has been applied, we have no 
prior cases defining the contours of a reasonable search in the 
context of hybrids such as motor homes, house trailers, 
houseboats or yachts. In this case, the Court can barely 
glimpse the vast subculture associated with recreational ve-
hicles and mobile living quarters. 10 The line or lines separat-
ing mobile homes from permanent structures might have 
been drawn in various ways, with consideration given to 
whether the home is moving or at rest, whether it rests on 
land or water, the form of the vehicle's attachment to its loca-
tion, its potential speed of departure, its size and capacity to 
serve as a domicile, and its method of locomotion. Rational 
decision making strongly counsels against divining the uses 
and abuses of these vehicles in the vacuum of the first case 
raising the question before us. 
• Indeed, the improvident consideration of the question presented in this 
case is aggravated by the possibility that today's opinion may be purely ad-
visory if, on remand, the California Supreme Court simply reinstates its 
judgment under the California Constitution. The Court's opinion in Cali-
fornia v. Ramos has had just that fate. See People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 
136, 150-159, 689 P. 2d 430, 437-444 (1984), cert. pending, No. 84-1227. 
Cf. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553 (1983), on remand, State v. 
Neville, 346 N. W. 2d 425 (SD 1984); Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U. S. 1 
(1982), on remand, State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 814, 676 P. 2d 419 (1984) 
(en bane). 
'°See generally, 45 Trailer Life, No. 1 (1985); id., No. 2; 22 Motor Home, 
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Of course, we may not abdicate our responsibility to clarify 
the law in this field. Some caution, however, is justified 
when every decision requires us to resolve a vexing "conflict 
... between the individual's constitutionally protected inter-
est in privacy and the public interest in effective law enforce-
ment." United States v. Ross, 456 U. S., at 804. "The cer-
tainty that is supposed to come from speedy resolution may 
prove illusory if a premature decision raises more questions 
than it answers." 11 The only true rules governing search 
and seizure have been formulated and refined in the painstak-
ing scrutiny of case-by-case ajudication. Consideration of 
this matter by the lower courts in a series of litigated cases 
would surely have facilitated a reasoned accommodation of 
the conflicting interests. To identify rules that will endure, 
we must rely on the state and lower federal courts to debate 
and evaluate the different approaches to difficult and unre-
solved questions of constitutional law. 12 Deliberation on the 
11 Hellman, The Proposed Intercircuit Tribunal: Do We Need It? Will It 
Work?, 11 Hastings Const. L.Q. 375, 405 (1984). 
12 "The Court ... should intervene only when a binding, authoritative 
decision is truly demanded. Absent relatively rare justifications for im-
mediate intervention, the Court as manager should accord a presumption 
of regularity or validity to the decisions of lower courts and should defer 
articulation of binding national law until all of the issues have been suffi-
ciently ventilated after a period of percolation in the state and lower fed-
eral courts. 
"Our view of the Court as manager .is committed in substantial measure 
to the policy of 'percolation' -that it is ordinarily best for the Court as man-
ager to stay its hand until there has been a period of exploratory consider-
ation and regional experimentation by the lower federal and state courts. 
Thus, we embrace lower-court percolation as an affirmative value rather 
than simply a rule of administrative convenience. The views of the lower 
courts on a particular legal issue provide the Supreme Court with a means 
of identifying significant rulings as well as an experiential base and set of 
doctrinal materials enabling the Court to fashion sound binding law. 
Moreover, the percolation process encourages the lower courts to act as 
responsible agents in the process of development of national law." 
Estreicher & Sexton, New York University Supreme Court Project 15 
(1985) (executive summary). 
-
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question over time winnows out the unnecessary and discor-
dant elements of doctrine and preserves "whatever is pure 
and sound and fine." 13 
II 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the "right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures." U. S. Const., 
Arndt. 4. We have interpreted this language to provide law 
enforcement officers with a bright-line standard: "searches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior ap-
proval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically 
established and well delineated exceptions." Katz v. United 
States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted); Arkan-
sas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 758 (1979). 
In United States v. Ross, the Court reaffirmed the primary 
importance of the general rule condemning warrantless 
searches, and emphasized that the exception permitting the 
search of automobiles without a warrant is a narrow one. 
456 U. S., at 824-825. We expressly endorsed "the general 
rule," stated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 156 
(1925), that "'[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is 
reasonably practicable, it must be used.'" 456 U. S., at 807. 
Given this warning and the presumption of regularity that at-
taches to a warrant, 14 it is hardly unrealistic to expect experi-
enced law enforcement officers to obtain a search warrant 
when one can easily be secured. 
The ascendancy of the Warrant Requirement in our system 
of justice must not be bullied aside by extravagant claims of 
necessity: 
"'The warrant requirement . . . is not an inconve-
nience to be somehow "weighed" against the claims of 
13 B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 179 (1921). 
1
• Leon v. United States, -- U. S. --, -- (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 
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police efficiency. It is, or should be, an important work-
ing part of our machinery of government, operating as a 
matter of course to check the "well-intentioned but mis-
takenly overzealous executive officers" who are a part of 
any system of law enforcement.' [Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 481 (1971).] 
"By requiring that conclusions concerning probable 
cause and the scope of a search 'be drawn by a neutral 
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the 
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime' Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 
10, 14 (1948), we minimize the risk of unreasonable as-
sertions of executive authority." Arkansas v. Sanders, 
442 U. S. at 758-759. 
If the motor home were parked in the exact middle of the in-
tersection between the general rule and the exception for 
automobiles, priority should be given to the rule rather than 
the exception. 
III 
The motor home, however, was not parked in the middle of 
that intersection. Our prior cases teach us that inherent mo-
bility is not a sufficient justification for the fashioning of an 
exception to the warrant requirement, especially in the face 
of heightened expectations of privacy in the location 
searched. Motor homes, by their common use and construc-
tion, afford their owners a substantial and legitimate expec-
tation of privacy when they dwell within. When a motor 
home is parked in a location that is removed from the public 
highway, I believe that society is prepared to recognize that 
the expectations of privacy within it are not unlike the expec-
tations one has in a fixed dwelling. As a general rule, such 
places may only be searched with a warrant based upon prob-
able cause. W arrantless searches of motor homes are only 
reasonable when the motor home is traveling on the public 
streets or highways, or when exigent circumstances other-
-
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wise require an immediate search without the expenditure of 
time necessary to obtain a warrant. 
As we explained in Ross, the automobile exception is the 
product of a long history: 
"since its earliest days Congress had recognized the 
impracticability of securing a warrant in cases involving 
the transportation of contraband goods. It is this im-
practicability, viewed in historical perspective, that pro-
vided the basis for the Carroll decision. Given the na-
ture of an automobile in transit, the Court recognized 
that an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers 
are to secure the illicit substance. In this class of cases, 
the Court held that a warrantless search of an automo-
bile is not unreasonable." 456 U. S., at 806-807 (foot-
notes omitted). 15 
The automobile exception has been developed to ameliorate 
the practical problems associated with the search of vehicles 
that have been stopped on the streets or public highways be-
cause there was probable cause to believe they were trans-
porting contraband. Until today, however, the Court has 
never decided whether the practical justifications that apply 
to a vehicle that is stopped in transit on a public way apply 
with the same force to a vehicle parked in a lot near a court 
house where it could easily be detained while a warrant is 
issued. 16 
15 "As we have stated, the decision in Carroll was based on the Court's 
appraisal of practical considerations viewed in the perspective of history." 
456 U. S., at 820. 
16 In Cooli,dge v. N ew Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), a plurality re-
fused to apply the automobile exception to an automobile that was seized 
while parked in the driveway of the suspect's house, towed to a secure po-
lice compound, and later searched: 
"The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth 
Amendment fades away and disappears. And surely there is nothing in 
this case to invoke the meaning and purpose of the rule of Carroll v. 
United States-no alerted criminal bent on flight, no fleeting opportunity 
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In this case, the motor home was parked in an off-the-
street lot only a few blocks from the courthouse in downtown 
San Diego where dozens of magistrates were available to en-
tertain a warrant application. 17 The officers clearly had the 
element of surprise with them, and with curtains covering 
the windshield, the motor home offered no indication of any 
imminent departure. The officers plainly had probable 
cause to arrest the petitioner and search the motor home, and 
on this record, it is inexplicable why they eschewed the safe 
harbor of a warrant. 18 
In the absence of any evidence of exigency in the circum-
stances of this case, the Court relies on the inherent mobility 
of the motor home to create a conclusive presumption of exi-
gency. This Court, however, has squarely held that mobil-
ity of the place to be searched is not a sufficient justification 
or weapons, no confederates waiting to move the evidence, not even the 
inconvenience of a special police detail to guard the immobilized automo-
bile. In short, by no possible stretch of the legal imagination can this be 
made into a case where 'it is not practicable to secure a warrant.' (267 
U. S., at 153,] and the 'automobile exception' despite its label, is simply 
irrelevant.'' 403 U. S., at 462 (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Douglas, 
BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ.). 
In Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583 (1974), a different plurality approved 
the seizure of an automobile from a public parking lot, and a later examina-
tion of its exterior. Id. , at 592-594 (opinion ofBLACKMUN, J.). Here, of 
course, we are ooncerned with the reasonableness of the search, not the 
seizure. Even if the diminished expectations of privacy associated with an 
automobile justify the warrantless search of a parked automobile notwith-
standing the diminished exigency, the heightened expectations of privacy 
in the interior of motor home require a different result. 
11 See Suppression Hearing Tr. 7; Tr. Oral Arg. 27. In addition, a tele-
phonic warrant was only 20 cents and the nearest phone booth away. See 
Cal. Penal Code§ 1526(b), § 1528(b); People v. Morrongiello, 145 Cal. App. 
3d 1, 9, 193 Cal. Rptr. 105, 109 (1983). 
18 This willingness to search first and later seek j ustifi.cation has properly 
been characterized as "a decision roughly comparable in prudence to deter-
mining whether an electrical wire is charged by grasping it." United 
States v. Mitchell, 538 F . 2d 1230, 1233 (CA5 1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 
430 u. s. 945 (1977). 
-
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for abandoning the warrant requirement. In United States 
v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977), the Court held that a war-
rantless search of a footlocker violated the Fourth Amend-
ment even though there was ample probable cause to believe 
it contained contraband. The Government had argued that 
the rationale of the automobile exception applied to movable 
containers in general, and that the warrant requirement 
should be limited to searches of homes and other "core" areas 
of privacy. See id., at 7. We categorically rejected the 
Government's argument observing that there are greater pri-
vacy interests associated with containers than with automo-
biles, 19 and that there are less practical problems associated 
with the temporary detention of a container than with the de-
tention of an automobile. See 433 U. S., at 13, and n. 7. 
We again endorsed that analysis in Ross: 
"The Court in Chadwick specifically rejected the argu-
ment that the warrantless search was 'reasonable' be-
cause a footlocker has some of the mobile characteristics 
that support warrantless searches of automobiles. The 
Court recognized that 'a person's expectations of privacy 
in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an 
automobile,' [433 U. S., at 13], and noted that the practi-
cal problems associated with the temporary detention of 
a piece of luggage during the period of time necessary to 
obtain a warrant are significantly less than those associ-
ated with the detention of an automobile. Id., at 13, 
n. 7." 456 U. S., at 811. 
19 "The factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do not 
apply to respondent's footlocker. Luggage contents are not open to public 
view, except as a condition to a border entry or common carrier travel; nor 
is luggage subject to regular inspections and official scrutiny on a continu-
ing basis. Unlike an automobile, whose primary function is transporta-
tion, luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects. In sum, a 
person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially 





CALIFORNIA v. CARNEY 
-
It is perfectly obvious that the citizen has a much greater 
expectation of privacy concerning the interior of a mobile 
home than of a piece of luggage such as a footlocker. If "in-
herent mobility" does not justify warrantless searches of con-
tainers, it cannot rationally provide a sufficient justifiction 
for the search of a person's dwelling place. 
Unlike a brick bungalow or a frame Victorian, a motor 
home seldom serves as a permanent lifetime abode. The mo-
tor home in this case, however, was designed to accommo-
date a breadth of ordinary everyday living. Photographs in 
the record indicate that its height, length and beam provided 
substantial living space inside: stuffed chairs surround a 
table; cupboards provide room for storage of personal effects; 
bunk-beds provide sleeping space; and a refrigerator pro-
vides ample space for food and beverages. 20 Moreover, cur-
tains and large opaque walls inhibit viewing the activities in-
side from the exterior of the vehicle. The interior 
configuration of the motor home establishes that the vehicle's 
size, shape, and mode of construction should have indicated 
to the officers that it was a vehicle containing mobile living 
quarters. 
The State contends that officers in the field will have an im-
possible task determining whether or not other vehicles con-
tain mobile living quarters. It is not necessary for the Court 
to resolve every unanswered question in this area in a single 
case, but common English usage suggests that we already 
distinguish between a "motor home" which is "equipped as a 
self-contained traveling home," a "camper" which is only 
equipped for "casual travel and camping," and an automobile 
which is "designed for passenger transportation. " 21 Surely 
the exteriors of these vehicles contain clues about their dif-
ferent functions which could alert officers in the field to the 
necessity of a warrant. 22 
20 Tr. Ex. Nos. 102, 103. 
21 Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 77, 160, 752 (1975). 
22 In applying the California Supreme Court's decision in Carney, the 
California Court of Appeals has had no difficulty in distinguishing the mo-
-
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The California Vehicle Code also refutes the State's argu-
ment that the exclusion of "motor homes" from the automo-
bile exception would be impossible to apply in practice. In 
its definitional section, the Code distinguishes campers and 
house cars from station wagons, and suggests that they are 
special categories of the more general terms-motor vehicles 
and passenger vehicles. 23 A "house car" is "a motor vehicle 
originally designed, or permanently altered, and equipped for 
human habitation, or to which a camper has been perma-
nently attached." 24 Alcoholic beverages may not be opened 
or consumed in motor vehicles traveling on the highways, ex-
cept in the "living quarters of a housecar or camper." 25 The 
same definitions might not necessarily apply in the context of 
the Fourth Amendment, but they do indicate that descriptive 
distinctions are humanly possible. They also reflect the 
California Legislature's judgment that "house cars" entertain 
different kinds of activities than the ordinary passenger 
vehicle. 
In my opinion, searches of places that regularly accommo-
date a wide range of private human activity are funda-
mentally different from searches of automobiles which pri-
marily serve a public transportation function. 26 Although it 
tor home involved there from a Ford van, People v. Chestnut, 151 Cal. 
App. 3d 721, 726-727, 198 Cal. Rptr. 8, 11 (1983), and a cab-high camper 
shell on the back of a pick-up truck, People v. Gordon, 156 Cal. App. 3d 74, 
82, 202 Cal. Rptr. 566, 570 (1984). There is no reason to believe that 
trained officers could not make similar distinctions between different vehi-
cles, especially when California law already requires them to do so in en-
forcing the state vehicle code. 
23 Cal. Vehicle Code § § 243, § 362, 415, 465, 585. 
24 ld. § 362. 
u Id., § 23221, § 23223, § 23225, § 23226, § 23229. 
26 Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 u.S. 583, 590 (1974) (opinion of BLACKMUN, 
J.): 
"One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its func-
tion is transportation, and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the 
repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public 
scrutiny. It travels through public thoroughfares where both its occu-
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may not be a castle, a motor home is usually the functional 
equivalent of a hotel room, a vacation and retirement home, 
or a hunting and fishing cabin. These places may be as spar-
tan as a humble cottage when compared to the most majestic 
mansion, 456 U. S. at 822; ante, at 7, but the highest and 
most legitimate expectations of privacy associated with these 
temporary abodes should command the respect of this Court. 
Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 490 (1964); Payton v. 
New York, 445 U. S., at 585; United States v. Karo, --
U. S. --, -- (1984).<n In my opinion, a warrantless 
search of living quarters in a motor home is "presumptively 
unreasonable absent exigent circumstances." Ibid. 
I respectfully dissent. 
'l:I "At the risk of belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in 
which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intru-
sion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that 
society is prepared to recognize as justifiable. Our cases have not devi-
ated from this basic Fourth Amendment principle. Searches and seizures 
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent 
exigent circumstances." United States v. Karo, -- U.S. --, --
(1984). 
CHAMl!IERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -
.iUFtmi> Q}:onri of tqt 'Jniub .jtatts 
:Jlfulfinghtn. J. Cl+· 20ffe'!-, 
April 22, 1985 
Re: 83-859 - California v. Carney 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
✓ 
I have deferred circulating a revised draft until the dissent 
was available. 
A new draft will be around tomorrow. 
- -i\iqn-tm.t <!firn:ri of tfrt 1lnitth .itaft.e' 
CHAMl!IERS or 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
-.uJri:n¢cn. ~- QI. 2llp'!~ 
April 22, 1985 
No. 83-859 
California v. Carney 
Dear John, 
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• 
~u.prnnt C!):aurt of tqt ~lt .;%tldts 
'JJl:Ulirittgtan. ~- <q. 20,?.>!~ 
C HAMBERS O F 











RE: No. 83-859, California v. Carney, the Chief's second draft 
After you left yesterday, the Chief sent you a second 
draft of Carney. The draft was not circulated to any other 
chambers. Although you might have approached the problem 
differently, I believe that you can now join the CJ's opinion. 
The Chief has complied substantially with your requests of March 
8, 1985. 
The first draft, of course, suggested that mobility was 
the primary justification for the "automobile exception." The 
new draft recognizes that "ready mobility is_not the only basis -------- ---for the automobile exception." Page 5. Moreover, it makes clear 
that the Court's hoia ing is limited to those situations when the 
vehicle is on a public highway or "in a place not regularly used 
for residential purposes--temporary or otherwise." Page 6. The 
Court expressly leaves open the question of whether a warrantless 
search is permissible when the motor home is "situated in a way 
or place that objectively indicates that it is being used as a 
residence." Page 8 n.3. 
I recommend that you give the Chief an "O.K." on his 
second draft. 
- -
Aoril 23 , 1()85 
PERS0~AT, 
83-859 ralifornia v . rarnev 
Dear Chief: 
I have reviewed th~ secon~ ~raft of your opinion, 
sent to me vester~ay ~fter~oon, ~"~ will be haopy to ioin 
you when it is circulated . 
I now think it is a fine opi~i0n . 
Si.n~erE>Jv, 
The Chief Justice 
l fp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
- -
April 23 , 1985 
83- 859 Ca l ifornia v. Carnev 
Dear Chief : 
Please ioin me . 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc : ~he Conference 
Sincerely , 
- -
,Siqn-tuu <4'our-t &tf t41 ~b .jbdt.e 
'Bhuiqin~ J. <4'. 20ffe.ll-~ 
CHAMeERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
April 24, 1985 
Re: No. 83-859-California v. Carney 
Dear John: 









JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
-
~nm ~ourl of tltt 1{nitt.b .-tatt.-
'1'uJrutgtcn. ~- <lt• 2llp'l, 
Re: No. 83-859, California v. Carney 
Dear Chief: 
April 25, 1985 
/ 
Please join me in your recirculation of April 23. 
The Chief Justice 





JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
-
,ju.prt1ttt (ij.ourt 4tf t411lnittb ,jbdt.s' 
Jla,e-Jtutgton, ~. (ij. 2ll'c?,., 
April 25, 1985 
/ 
Re: 83-859 California v. Charles R. Carney 
Dear Chief, 




The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMeERS 01" 
- -
~nu (!}Dttrl of l4t ~b ,tatte 
,rul{ingt&m. J. (!}. 2llp,., 
/ 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN April 26, 1985 
Re: No. 83-859, California v. Carney 
Dear Chief: 
I, for one, hope that you will not delete the second 
sentence of footnote 3 on page 8 of your recirculation of 
April 23. With that sentence retained, I think we have a 
fairly bright line test which should be of help to law 
enforcement officers. It is helpful dicta, and I hope it 
will remain in the opinion. 
My joinder, however, is unaffected. 
The Chief Justice 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -
.iu.pum.t <!f ourl of tJrt ~b j;tzdts 
'Jhui lfinghtn. ~. <If. 2ilffe'!, 
April 29, 1985 
Re: No. 83-859 - California v. Carney 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
/ 
We had this case on as a "tentative" for Monday's: 
announcement. 
I will have some small additions in short order. 
Regards, 
CHAMeERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -
.inprnn:t (4omt of i4t~b .itatts-
Jrasfring-ton. ~. <lf. 20~~~ 
May 9, 1985 
Re: No. 83-859 - California v. Charles R. Carney 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I have concluded not to enlarge the opinion in this 
case. 




83-859 California v. Carney (Lee) 
CJ for the Court 11/9/84 
1st draft 2/28/85 
2nd draft 4/23/85 






1st draft 4/18/85 
Joined by WJB 4/22/85 
JPS will dissent 2/28/85 
• 
WJB may write, will await JPS's writing 3/1/85 
